“Part of our present difficulty is that we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live simultaneously within the different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed, rules of the micro-cosmos (i.e. of the small band or troop, or of, say, our families) to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilisation), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. So we must learn to live in two sorts of world at once.”

The “small band or troop” identities in African countries are prevalent and cause an all or nothing mentality, when it comes to government. Basically, these tribes do not differ in values alone, they attribute most of their identity to heritage. The attempted representation heritage and values, of each tribe, in a democracy would minimize each and ultimately destroy the system.

It’s difficult to enlarge the graphics to a readable size but what I can gather is not very convincing. China in the middle of the growth scale? Something must be wrong there. f this is level rather than rate of growth, so many historical factors are excluded as to render a two dimensional discussion useless. Furthermore the correlation even if there is one which I sincerely doubt maybe the inverse, e.g., poor people adopting more communal values to survive and poverty rather thn the value system also engendering less stable governance.

A final point since I’v lived in France for many years, the French while having great respect for the individual also have a very strong collective sense, as is the case in Belgium, the Netherlands and most of continental Europe. Try again this looks really beneath you/

.

SS

(1) Is the small dataset a problem? From the look of the graphs above it seems to me that the dataset excludes a lot of states that might alter the data (though I emphasise “might”). I’m thinking particularly of gulf states and Middle Eastern states in general. In the case of a significant number of relatively wealthy states with high levels of development being added will the result still stand?

(2) What is the proposed causal link for this result and has it been / can it be tested?

Can anyone shed some light?

2. The idea of all men equal and individual freedom is strong in my country (Norway). Traditionally, we have lived in micro-groups far away from each other, on scattered farms. Small groups and scattered populations, at least I believe, will enhance believs in individual equity rather than oppose it. Welfare states in Scandianvia is more of an insurance towards external shocks than a culture of group thinking. Remember that we’ve had very open economies for millennias.

3. The relation between democracy and growth is also unclear, however, it may seems as democracies, on average, cope better with external shocks and conflict resolution – both important factors for development, regardless of how you define it.

Another relatively new paper related to thi topic is available at AfroBarometer: http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo98.pdf

Note the link to Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom.

But his work would also suggest that the direction of causality goes something like “growth – values – democracy”, rather than “values – democracy – growth”. In other words, as people get richer, their values tend to evolve in a predictable direction (towards more emphasis on individual self-determination) and this in turn drives them towards the form of governance that can best guarantee that: democracy.

hasn’t this been in sociology literature for at least 100 years? if not, from the initial theorists?

This got rid of the idea that there were preordained classes of people (royalty and priests vs peasants) and that, therefore, people were capable of governing themselves. This breakthrough is still not widely accepted even three centuries later.

Now coupling democracy with capitalism is something that has a spotty intellectual history. During the early industrial revolution the UK was far from a functional democracy, yet it had robust growth and the creation of all sorts of capitalist institutions over a fairly short period of time.

So one can have capitalism without democracy and still have high growth.

I forget whose recent book focused on luck as a factor. High growth, democratic societies have tended to be those with abundant natural resources, good agricultural land and decent climate. Transport Manchester in the 19th Century to sub-Saharan Africa and I doubt you would have seen the same amount of economic development.

One should argue for democratic governance from the usual ethical principles, John Rawls can serve as the model for the appropriate arguments.

But if a society which governs itself choses not to pursue materialism then it should not be considered as a failure and deficient in development.

I keep claiming that the impending shortages of natural resources and the pressure of overpopulation will force many advanced societies into reconsidering this pursuit of materialism and what should substitute for it.

I have several essays on my web site with my 2 cents on what these alternative societies might look like.